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Summary 
The aim of the paper is to present evidence that China and India are, and will remain, two 
very different actors in international negotiations to control global warming. We base our 
conclusions on historical data and on scenarios until 2050. The Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BaU) is compared to four Emissions Tax scenarios to draw insights on major 
transformations in energy use and in energy supply and to assess the possible contribution 
of China and India to a future international climate architecture. We study whether or not 
the Copenhagen intensity targets require more action than the BaU scenario and we assess 
whether the emissions reductions induced by the four tax scenarios are compatible with the 
G8 and MEF pledge to reduce global emissions by 50% in 2050. 
 
Keywords: Climate Change, China, India, Energy Efficiency, Energy and Development 
 
JEL Classification: Q32, Q43, Q54, Q43, O53, P52 
 
This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Sustainable Development Programme 
at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and by the Climate Impacts and Policy Division of the Euro-
Mediterranean Centre on Climate Change. Financial support under the Climate Policy Outreach 













Address for correspondence: 
 
Emanuele Massetti 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
C.so Magenta, 63 
20123, Milano 
Italy 
Phone: +39 02 520 36814 
E-mail: emanuele.massetti@feem.it    1
 
A Tale of Two Countries: 






Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
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transformations in energy use and in energy supply and to assess the 
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1. Introduction 
China and India are two Asian giants and global players. They are home to about 
one-third of the world population and they are both experiencing prolonged periods of 
high economic growth. China’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has 
grown at the striking average rate of 9.5% per year from 1990 to 1999; from 2000 to 
2009 the expansion of the economy has further accelerated, with an average annual 
growth rate of 10.5% per year. Double-digit growth rates over twenty years have 
generated a stunning five-fold increase of GDP per capita in China. India’s economic 
growth has been slower in comparison with China, but still remarkably high during the 
last twenty years.
1 India’s GDP per capita growth rate has been equal to 5% per year, on 
average, from 1990 to 1999; growth has accelerated in this decade, with an average 
increase of 7.4% per year from 2000 to 2009. The average Indian citizen is now 2.4 
times richer than in 1990. However, despite this unprecedented period of prosperity, she 
is still three-times poorer than her Chinese counterpart. The economic gap between the 
two countries has widened over the past twenty years: in 1990 average GDP per capita 
was twenty percent higher in China than in India, in 2000 it was twice higher and in 
2009 three times higher. 
Chindia – as many commentators now refer to the two Asian giants
2 – is certainly 
a useful geo-political construct, but the two countries are still very diverse. The gaps in 
income, energy use and emissions – both in per capita and in absolute levels – will very 
likely remain wide for several decades. When discussing the future impact of the two 
countries’ development pattern on global climate change and possible ways to include 
them in the efforts to contain global warming, we definitely still need to tell a tale of 
two countries. Often blamed together for not doing enough to reduce their Greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) emissions, China and India have two very distinct historical and future 
development trajectories. 
China’s carbon intensity of energy – the carbon dioxide embodied in each unit of 
energy – was 30% higher than India’s in 1990 and still is 23% higher in 2007; the 
energy intensity of output in China – the energy embodied in each unit of GDP – was 
                                                 
1  Data on GDP, energy use, electricity use and carbon emissions are from the World Development 
Indicators 2009, The World Bank. 
2 According to Wikipedia, the credit of coining the now popular term goes to Jairam Ramesh, an Indian 
politician.   3
twice higher than in India in 1990, 30% higher in 2000 and 45% higher in 2007. As a 
result, despite a remarkable decline over the past twenty years, the carbon intensity of 
GDP is today 30% higher in China than in India. All the dynamics of income per capita, 
of carbon intensity of energy, of energy intensity of GDP and the level of population, 
explain why China’s carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in 2005 were 
roughly five times higher than India’s emissions (6.5 Gt per year in China and 1.2 Gt 
per year in India). China was responsible for 22% of global carbon dioxide emissions in 
2005; India for only 4%. For a comparison, emissions of carbon dioxide from fuel 
combustion in the United States were equal to 6.4 Gt in 2005, slightly lower than 
China’s emissions; the emissions of Japan were roughly equal to India’s emissions, with 
a total population only one-ninth of the Indian one. 
The aim of this paper is to present evidence that China and India are, and will 
remain, two very different actors on the scene of international negotiations to control 
global warming. We base our conclusions on historical data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and on scenarios developed using the hybrid Integrated 
Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH. A Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario explores the 
optimal economic and energy system dynamics without any policy explicitly conceived 
to reduce GHGs emissions. It is important to stress that the BaU scenario does however 
implicitly include all the policies that are enacted to respond optimally to changing 
prices of inputs, both at domestic (capital, labour) and at international level (fuels, 
investment cost in renewables, knowledge spillovers). Policies whose aim is to increase 
energy efficiency are therefore implicitly included in the BaU scenario. Policies to 
reduce GHGs emissions – i.e. by switching from coal to natural gas or to renewables – 
are instead part of the four Tax Scenarios. 
It is by all means unrealistic to expect that either China or India will introduce a 
tax on GHGs emissions anytime in the near future. We use here the Tax scenarios to 
illustrate significant issues, similarities and differences, that would emerge as an 
optimal response to economic and regulatory incentives to reduce GHGs emissions. We 
focus our attention on the implications that a tax on emissions has on both carbon 
intensity of energy and energy intensity of GDP, on total GHGs emissions and on the 
marginal and macroeconomic cost of the climate policy. 
China and India have captured the attention of researchers in all disciplines. 
Energy and environmental economists are not an exception. The International Energy   4
Agency has dedicated the 2007 World Energy Outlook to a careful analysis of the 
energy sector in China and India (IEA 2007). Long-term scenarios of energy demand 
and supply for China and India have been developed by all modelling groups 
participating in the recent Energy Modelling Forum 22 (EMF22 2009; Clarke et al 
2009), by McKibbin, Wilcoxen and Woo (2008), Hengyun Oxley and Gibson (2009), 
Vöhringer et al (2010), Li (2008).
3 Pachauri and Jiang (2008) compared the energy 
transition in China and India at household level and found many significant differences 
between the two countries.  
We complement this growing literature by highlighting those aspects that emerge 
from the analysis of energy and emissions scenarios for China and India that are 
relevant for the next rounds of negotiations. The target is not an audience of energy 
experts or the IAMs community. We rather aim at reaching the diverse community of 
negotiators and policy makers engaged in promoting actions against global warming at 
local, national and international level. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader to 
historic data and to the BaU scenario. Section 2 also contains a brief overview of the 
WITCH model. Section 3 presents the four Tax scenarios. The implications in terms of 
energy demand, emissions and economic cost in China and India will be discussed 
thoroughly. Conclusions follow. 
2.  Historic data and the BaU scenario 
In this Section we merge historical data and future scenarios to sketch a profile of 
China and India that highlights crucial issues for future negotiations on climate change. 
Scenarios on future economic growth, energy use and carbon emissions were generated 
using the hybrid Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH – World Induced 
Technical Change Hybrid model (Bosetti et al 2006; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni 2007; 
Bosetti et al 2007; witchmodel.org).
4   Key characteristics of WITCH are (1) an 
economic growth engine that allows the study of economic development over long time 
                                                 
3 Recently, the Integrated Assessment Modelling community has gathered to discuss long-term energy 
and emissions scenarios for Asian economies in the Asia Modelling Exercise. However, a whole set of 
new scenarios will not be published until the end of 2011. 
4 By combining the economy, energy, ecosystems and climate, IAMs allow the creation of scenarios on 
future GHGs emissions and the study of transition pathways towards a low-carbon world. For a 
discussion of key characteristics and use of IAMs see, among others, Dowlatabadi (1995), Ackerman et al 
(2010) and Weyant (2010).   5
horizons; (2) a “perfect foresight” approach that incorporates events that are expected to 
happen in the future in present decisions; (3) a focus on endogenous technical change 
dynamics; and (4) the description of non-cooperative interaction among world regions 
on several global public goods – e.g. global climate, scientific knowledge and natural 
resources. 
2.1. Economic  growth 
China and India start from two very different levels of economic development. 
China is a major world economy with a GDP three times higher than the GDP of India 
in 2005. The difference remains remarkable even if we account for a larger population 
in China: India’s GDP per capita is only 40% of the GDP per capita in China. The gap 
between the two countries has doubled during the past fifteen years due to the extremely 
fast expansion of the Chinese economy. India is now catching up with Chinese 
economic growth rates and we expect that the Indian economy will grow faster than the 
Chinese economy from 2005 until 2050. However, in our BaU scenario the gap remains 
as wide as the present one for the next fifty years due to the current large absolute 
difference and higher population growth in India. China’s GDP per capita surpasses the 
average of the rest of the world (ROW) in 2050, while India’s GDP per capita remains 
60% lower than in the ROW. 
The remarkable economic performance of both countries during the past fifteen 
years is so striking that it tends to obscure the fact that the average Chinese and the 
average Indian citizens remain poor. GDP per capita in China and India was only 5% 
and 2% of GDP per capita in OECD countries in 2005.
5 In our BaU scenario both China 
and India narrow the gap with respect to OECD economies in the next decades. 
However, the differences remain disproportionate even in 2050: China’s GDP per capita 
is one-third of the GDP per capita in OECD economies, India’s GDP per capita is one-
tenth. The fact that the gap will remain large for many years in the future is confirmed 
by other long-run scenarios. For example, McKibbin, Wilcoxen and Woo (2008) see the 
Chinese GDP converging toward the US GDP in 2100; India would converge only in 
2150. 
                                                 
5 Using Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) instead of Market Exchange Rates (MER) to compare GDPs 
internationally would narrow the income gap between poor and rich countries.   6
1960 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 1960 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050
GDP (trillions constant 2000 US$) CO2 emissions (Gt)
China 0.07 0.13 0.44 1.91 7.38 17.00 28.00 China 0.78 1.14 2.46 5.61 9.32 13.91 17.44
India 0.06 0.14 0.27 0.64 2.21 5.58 11.23 India 0.12 0.25 0.69 1.41 1.94 3.43 5.15
OECD 6.07 12.00 19.49 27.75 46.98 63.00 79.82 OECD 5.70 9.85 10.94 12.40 17.06 19.35 21.85
World 7.28 14.70 24.22 36.71 69.70 110.27 159.47 World 9.44 16.91 22.53 29.21 38.49 50.41 62.54
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
China 105 146 392 1464 5164 11587 19741 China 1.17 1.25 2.17 4.30 6.52 9.48 12.30
India 145 220 318 589 1600 3587 6772 India 0.28 0.41 0.81 1.29 1.41 2.21 3.11
OECD 8523 14501 21403 27743 41069 53792 68047 OECD 8.01 11.90 12.01 12.40 14.91 16.52 18.63
World 2400 3611 4587 5676 9094 12846 17356 World 3.11 4.15 4.27 4.52 5.02 5.87 6.81
GDP Growth rate (percentage, average over fiftheen years interval) Population, total (billions)
China -- 2.2 6.8 9.2 8.8 5.5 3.6 China 0.667 0.916 1.135 1.304 1.430 1.468 1.418
India -- 2.8 2.5 4.2 6.9 5.5 4.3 India 0.435 0.613 0.850 1.095 1.379 1.554 1.658
OECD -- 3.6 2.6 1.7 2.6 1.8 1.6 OECD 0.712 0.828 0.911 1.000 1.144 1.171 1.173
World -- 2.8 1.6 1.4 3.2 2.3 2.0 World 3.032 4.071 5.279 6.467 7.664 8.584 9.188
Energy use (Mt of oil equivalent) Carbon Intensity of Energy (t of CO2 per Mt of oil equivalent)
China -- 484 863 1690 2698 4008 4951 China -- 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
India -- 177 318 534 720 1135 1630 India -- 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.2
OECD 1884 3529 4322 5239 5991 6619 7152 OECD 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.1
World -- 6094 8556 11090 13391 16936 20167 World -- 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.1
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) Energy Intensity of GDP (t of oil eq. per 1,000 constant 2000 US$)
China -- 528 760 1296 1887 2731 3491 China -- 3.63 1.94 0.89 0.37 0.24 0.18
India -- 289 375 488 522 730 983 India -- 1.31 1.18 0.83 0.33 0.20 0.15
OECD 2763 4266 4746 5238 5237 5652 6098 OECD 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.09
World -- 1366 1666 1769 1747 1973 2195 World -- 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.13
Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total) Carbon Intensity of GDP (t of CO2 eq. per 1,000 constant 2000 US$)
China -- 64 75 85 89 91 92 China -- 8.58 5.53 2.94 1.26 0.82 0.62
India -- 39 56 68 79 87 90 India -- 1.86 2.55 2.19 0.88 0.61 0.46
OECD 94 93 84 82 92 90 89 OECD 0.94 0.82 0.56 0.45 0.36 0.31 0.27




Notes: 1960-2005 historic data aggregated by the World Bank Development Indicators. Fossil fuel comprises coal, oil, petroleum, 
and natural gas products (source: International Energy Agency). Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to 
other end-use fuels (source: International Energy Agency). Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil 
fuels and the manufacture of cement (source: CDIAC). GDP at purchaser's prices data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Dollar 
figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2000 official exchange rates (Source: World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National Accounts data files). Population data is from a variety of sources, midyear estimates. 2020-2050 data are 
from the WITCH model Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Table 1. Historic data and future scenario on the economy, energy system and emissions. 
It is therefore clear that, for many years to come, China and India will accept to 
pay only a minimal fraction of the global cost to reduce GHGs emissions. This is not 
equivalent to saying that China and India will not contribute to the mitigation target. It 
rather suggests that high income countries need to pay for a large fraction of emissions 
reductions in China and India. 
2.2.  Energy intensity and carbon intensity 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 offer a synthetic look at the historic economic and energy 
development of China and India. Two major similarities emerge: in both countries GDP 
has grown at a faster rate than energy use and carbon dioxide emissions have grown 
faster than energy. However, these changes have happened at two very different speeds. 
Energy intensity in China has declined at an average rate of 4.6% per year from 1975 to   7
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Source: see notes to Table 1. Base year 1971. 
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Figure 2. The indices of energy intensity of GDP and of carbon intensity of energy. 
2005, in India by only 1.5% per year. Carbon intensity of energy has increased in both 
countries, but in India almost twice as fast as in China (+2.1% and +1.1% per year, on 
average).
6 The increase of emissions per unit of energy has been particularly strong in 
India due to a long-term decline of traditional biomass as a source of energy.
7 The 
increase of the carbon intensity of energy has been so strong in India, that it more than 
compensated the energy efficiency gains, causing an overall increase of carbon 
emissions per unit of GDP (at an average rate of 0.5% per year). In China, instead, the 
carbon intensity of GDP has declined at an average 3.5% per year. 
                                                 
6 For a detailed analysis of energy intensity trend in China and for a review of policies to increase energy 
efficiency see Levine and Aden (2008), Levine, Zhou and Price (2009), Zhou, Levine and Price (2010). 
7 Wooden fuels are cause of no net carbon emissions. When they are replaced with fossil fuels the carbon 
content energy increases considerably.   8
 
However, China started from a much higher level of energy content per unit of output 
and despite the relatively better performance, China still has 26% more carbon 
emissions per unit of energy and 7% more energy use per unit of GDP than India. As a 
result, the carbon intensity of GDP is 34% higher in China than in India. 
In the BaU scenario the carbon intensity of energy continues to grow in both 
countries, faster in India than in China, with the two countries converging to similar 
levels in 2050. The energy intensity of GDP is instead declining in both countries, at 
similar rates. China’s development path will remain relatively more intensive in energy 
use: in 2050 the carbon content of each unit of GDP is going to be 34% higher in China 
than in India, exactly as in 2005. Compared to other world regions, China and India will 
continue to have energy and carbon intensity higher than the average. The gap with the 
world average disappears in 2050, but a large difference remains with respect to OECD 
economies, which continue to be much more efficient and less carbon intensive than 
China and India (see Table 1). 
2.3.  Energy demand and emissions 
The scale of the two Asian giants is so big that any efficiency gain is more than 
compensated by the sheer size of economic growth. Despite energy use per unit of GDP 
was cut four-fold between 1975 and 2005, energy demand has increased 3.5 times 
during the same period in China. In India energy use was cut by 40% from 1975 to 2005, 
but energy use has increased by 70%. The rapid expansion of the economy has 
transformed China in one of the key players of the global energy commodities market. 
India’s demand for energy is growing, but its demand is still one third less than China’s. 
The gap between the two countries will remain substantially unchanged in percentage 
terms, but will become huge in absolute terms: China will consume about 3,300 Mtoe 
more than India in 2050, twice the present level of energy use in China. China will 
absorb 25% of global energy supply, India “only” 8%. Again, this tells a story in which 
both countries are expected to become giants of future global commodities markets, but 
China will be in a totally different position from India. 
In both countries energy consumption per capita is substantially lower than in 
OECD economies and lower than the global average, in 2005. The gap with OECD   9
economies remains wide even after many decades of growth in our scenario. However, 
while India is below global energy per capita average use, China surpasses the global 
average in 2050. 
Differences between China and India are also present in the composition of total 
primary energy supply (TPES), as detailed in Figure 3. While the energy mix of China 
is similar to the global one in 2005, with roughly 80% of total energy coming from 
fossil sources, India has a larger share of energy coming from traditional biomass – e.g. 
fuelwood.
8 The use of traditional biomass in India is expected to decline in the next 
decades in favour of more efficient liquid fuels. Eventually, the fossil fuels content of 
energy is expected to converge at approximately 90%. 
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Notes: The vertical axes have different scales in the two figures. Source: WITCH model BaU scenario. 
Figure 3. Total primary energy supply in China and India. 
2.4.  A tale of two countries 
The differences between the Chinese and the Indian development pattern are 
summarized in Figure 4. We report the combination of all GHGs emissions per capita 
and GDP per capita for China, India and the ROW, from 2005 to 2050, at five-year time 
intervals. India starts from a lower level of income and emissions per capita. As the 
economy grows, India’s per capita emissions increase, but emissions per capita remain 
always lower than in China, at any stage of economic development. The Chinese 
development pattern is highly intensive in emissions also compared to the ROW: at the 
same level of economic development China is expected to emit roughly three extra 
tonnes of CO2-eq than the ROW in 2050. 
                                                 
8 Still 80% of cooking in rural India comes from fuelwood; in 2030 this share is expected to decline to 
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Notes: Each data point marks the combination of GDP per capita and GHGs emissions from 2005 to 2050. BaU and CTax3 
scenarios. ROW: Rest of the World (World minus China and India). Source: WITCH model. 
Figure 4. GHGs emissions and development. 
Large populations, fast economic expansion, high energy and carbon intensities, 
all explain why Chinese and Indian emissions have an increasing role in shaping global 
concentrations of GHGs. In 2005 China and India together accounted for 29% of global 
carbon dioxide emissions from fuels use; in 2050 this share is expected to increase to 
36%, according to our BaU scenario. Again, however, it is still a tale of two different 
countries: while China will be by far the largest emitter in 2050, India will have 
emerged as a global actor, but its share will remain “only” 8%, smaller than the EU27 
and the USA in 2050 in our BaU scenario. 
The importance of including India in a global climate agreement soon is therefore 
probably overrated in the literature and in the policy debate. China and India start from 
two very different levels of economic prosperity and different levels of GHGs emissions 
and their development patterns do not seem to converge: India’s CO2 emissions in 2050 
– both in absolute and in per capita level – will be roughly comparable to China’s 
emissions in 2005 (see Table 1). It is therefore unfair, to treat these two countries 
equally in the next rounds of negotiations. Further elements that suggest a differential 
treatment between China and India in international negotiations are discussed in Section 
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Notes: Carbon intensity reductions for China as predicted in the reference scenarios of the EMF22 participating models (Clarke et al 
2009), the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2009, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
International Energy Outlook 2009. The shadowed box marks the -40/-45 percent target of China and the -20/-25 percent target of 
India, pledged in the Copenhagen Accord. The contraction of carbon intensity of energy for the WITCH model does not correspond 
to what reported in the text because a different value of carbon intensity for 2005 was used to allow comparability among models. 
Source: adapted from Tavoni (2010). 
Figure 5. Carbon intensity reductions for China and India in 2020. 
2.5.  The Copenhagen pledges 
Before exploring future scenarios, it is instructive to assess what is the level of 
ambition embedded in the pledges that China and India have made at the Fifteenth 
Conference of Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen, in November 2009. Both China and 
India have preferred intensity targets (GHGs emissions per unit of GDP) to absolute 
targets: China has pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its economy by 40/45% 
in 2020 with respect to 2005, and India by 20/25%.
9 
The official pronouncements made in Copenhagen sparked an intense debate to 
assess whether China and India’s promises implied explicit action to reduce GHGs 
emissions or whether their emission reduction targets will be achieved as part of the 
BaU development pattern. As mentioned above, the BaU pattern does not exclude 
decisions to increase energy efficiency or to expand carbon-free energy sources, that are 
taken for the national interest, not for slowing down climate change. 
According to our BaU scenario the carbon intensity of the economy will decline 
by 57% in China and by 45% in India. The emissions intensity (including all GHGs) 
                                                 
9 China also committed to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
15% by 2020 and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 
billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 2005 levels. The emissions from the agriculture sector will not be 
part of the assessment of emissions intensity of India. See Carraro and Massetti (2010) for a wider 
comparison of the Copenhagen Pledges.   12
will decline by 59% in China and by 50% in India.
10 Well above both countries’ pledges. 
How do our results compare with analogous studies in the literature? 
Tavoni (2010) gathered energy and emissions scenarios from the Energy 
Modelling Forum 22 (EMF 22), the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy 
Outlook 2009 and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy 
Outlook 2009, to compare China’s and India’s pledges to scenarios in the literature. The 
result is shown in Figure 5. Nine out of fifteen models expect that China will achieve 
the -40% target in the reference scenario, with the median exactly at -40%. Eight out of 
twelve models expect that India will achieve the -20% target in the reference scenario, 
with the median lying at -33%, well below the target. This does not mean that the two 
targets will come at no cost. Rather, it implies that the two countries’ pledges appear to 
be part of national strategies to reduce the energy intensity of the economies for 
domestic reasons. With a stable, or slightly increasing carbon content of energy, these 
domestic commitments deliver also carbon intensity reductions. Reduced emissions 
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Notes: All GHGs emissions included. Source: WITCH model. 
Figure 6. The emissions tax scenarios. 
                                                 
10 The reduction of carbon intensity is calculated using WITCH’s 2005 base year. There are differences 
between our base year and data for 2005 displayed in Table 1 due to different sources. Therefore Table 1 
implies different rates of carbon intensity reductions.   13
3. The  tax  scenarios 
In this Section we explore scenarios in which policy measures are explicitly taken 
to reduce the level of GHGs emissions in China and India. We focus on four emissions 
tax scenarios and we assume that the same tax applies to all GHGs, in all world regions. 
It is not realistic to assume that either China or India, or both, will introduce taxes on 
GHGs emissions in the next years. However, taxes are a good proxy for other policy 
tools – i.e. command-and-control measures, clean development mechanisms, cap-and-
trade systems linked to international carbon markets – that must be implemented to 
reduce emissions. The four tax scenarios all start from 2020, beyond the horizon of the 
Copenhagen Accord. The CTax1 scenario starts with a tax on all GHGs emissions fixed 
at 10 US$ per ton of CO2-eq; the CTax2 scenario starts from 30 US$ per ton; the CTax3 
from 50 US$ (Figure 6). Then, in all three scenarios the tax increases by 5% per year 
and tax revenues are rebated lump-sum in the economy. We study a fourth scenario 
(CTax4) which induces emissions reductions in line with a global GHGs concentrations 
target of 535 ppm at the end of the century.
11 
2.6. Emissions  trajectories 
Figure 7 displays the optimal trajectory of emissions in the four policy scenarios 
and in the BaU. The CTax4 scenario induces the biggest cuts in emissions, followed 
closely by the CTax3 scenario and the CTax2 scenario. The lowest tax achieves only 
“moderate” emissions reductions.
12 
Figure 8 displays the percentage deviation of emissions in each tax scenario with 
respect to the BaU and with respect to the level of emissions in 2005. A first important 
message is that in no case taxes are sufficiently high to push India’s emissions below 
the 2005 level. Even in 2050, when the CTax4 achieves a remarkable level (400 US$ 
per tCO2-eq). The picture is different for China: all the tax scenarios except for the 
CTax1 push emissions below the 2005 level. The different response of the two 
                                                 
11 The emissions tax is obtained by solving the model imposing a global pattern of emissions that is 
consistent with the 2100 concentration target and allowing countries to trade emissions allowances 
internationally to equate marginal abatement costs. We then run the model imposing the carbon price as a 
tax, thus avoiding complex distribution issues. This concentration target is equivalent to a temperature 
increase of 2.5°C above the pre-industrial level with median probability in 2100, well above the stated 
objective of keeping temperature increase below the 2°C. 
12  WITCH is a perfect foresight model. The level of future taxation influences present decisions. 
Therefore it is optimal to smooth the transition to a regime of emissions taxes in WITCH. This explains 
why emissions decline with respect to the BaU before 2020 in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Equivalently, the 
high level of taxes in 2050 affects investment decisions in earlier years.   14
economies is explained by the fact that India has relatively higher marginal abatement 
costs (see Figure 10), higher economic growth over the period under exam, it starts 
from lower levels of energy and emissions per capita, and it will have a larger 
population than China in 2050. The contraction of emissions with respect to the BaU 
scenario is instead remarkable in both countries – although still higher in China than in 
India. Even a modest climate policy (CTax1) would save the planet 7Gt CO2-eq in 2050, 
8% of global GHGs emissions in the BaU scenario. This explains how important it is 
that China and India enact even a modest climate policy in the next decades. 
It is instructive to compare the change of emissions under the tax scenarios with 
respect to 2005 with the global emissions reduction target of -50% set forth by the G8 
and Major Economies Forum (MEF) countries in L’Aquila in July 2009. G8 countries 
have agreed to lead the mitigation effort and have committed to reducing GHGs 
emissions by 80% in 2050.
13 This implies that the rest of the world needs to reduce 
emissions by roughly 25-30% in 2050 to achieve the -50% target.
14 What is the implicit 
tax level that would guarantee those emissions cuts in China and India? 
We have seen that none of the tax levels considered would deliver emissions in 
2050 lower than those in 2005 in India; in China instead the CTax3 scenario would 
generate the necessary emissions reductions. In order to appreciate the effort needed to 
achieve the target, we need to consider that a -25% contraction of emissions with 
respect to 2005, in 2050, implies a -68% reduction below BaU for China and a -80% 
contraction for India. This reveals that the level of commitment of the two countries in 
the next forty years will necessarily be different and the peculiar role of China stands 
clearly out: not rich enough to afford stringent emissions cuts, but not poor enough to 
justify the lowest level of commitment. If we refer again to the G8 and MEF pledge, a 
more realistic distribution of effort would see China reducing emissions roughly by -
35% in 2050 with respect to 2005, and India limiting the increase of emissions to 50% 
above 2005. The marginal abatement cost would be equivalent in both countries and it 
would correspond to the highest level of taxation that we consider in this study. 
However, the realism of this level of taxation in both countries is highly questionable 
and casts doubts on the possibility to achieve the global target set forth by G8 and MEF 
                                                 
13 The reference year for the emissions cuts is not clear. We use here 2005. An alternative would be 1990. 
Using the BaU as a reference would imply emissions levels not coherent with the 2°C target. 
14 If the -80% target is valid for Annex I countries Non-Annex I countries must reduce emissions by 22%. 
If the -80% target is valid only for G8 countries, Non Annex I countries must reduce emissions more.   15
countries. 













































































BaU CTax1 CTax2 CTax3 CTax4  
Notes: The vertical axes have different scales. Source: WITCH model.  
Figure 7. The time pattern of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions in India and China, in the BaU 
and in the tax scenarios. 
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CTax1 - BaU CTax2 - BaU CTax3 - BaU CTax4 - BaU
CTax1 - 2005 CTax2 - 2005 CTax3 - 2005 CTax4 - 2005  
Notes: Solid lines mark the change of GHGs emissions with respect to the BaU level. Dashed lines mark the change of GHGs 
emissions with respect to the level in 2005. Vertical axes have different scales. Source: WITCH model. 
Figure 8. Change in Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions trajectories in India and China 
economies, in the tax scenarios. 
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 BaU CTax1 CTax2 CTax3 CTax4  
Notes: Each data point marks the combination of decarbonization of energy and energy efficiency improvements with respect to 
2005. Negative values of decarbonization improvements mean that the carbon content of energy is increasing. Source: WITCH 
model.   16
Figure 9. The time pattern of carbon intensity of energy and energy intensity of GDP in India and 
China, in the BaU and in the tax scenarios. 
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BaU 2.5% 3.9% 3.9% 4.6% 3.5% 7.9% 2.7%
CTax1 1.8% 4.0% 3.9% 5.7% 3.5% 9.3% 2.3%
CTax2 0.8% 3.9% 3.6% 7.4% 3.5% 11.4% 1.7%
CTax3 -0.8% 4.0% 3.6% 8.6% 3.5% 12.8% 1.3%
CTax4 -1.6% 3.4% 3.1% 9.0% 3.5% 13.3% 1.1%
2050‐2005 ( average per year )
BaU 2.2% 2.8% 2.9% 3.8% 2.2% 7.8% 2.2%
CTax1 1.3% 3.0% 2.7% 5.2% 2.2% 9.6% 1.7%
CTax2 -0.5% 2.7% 2.2% 6.7% 2.2% 11.6% 1.2%
CTax3 -1.2% 2.8% 1.8% 7.1% 2.2% 12.2% 1.1%
CTax4 -1.4% 2.1% 1.2% 7.5% 2.2% 12.8% 0.9%
India
2030‐2005 ( average per year )
BaU 3.8% 3.1% 4.1% 5.1% 3.3% 8.5% 2.3%
CTax1 2.7% 3.5% 4.1% 6.2% 3.3% 9.8% 1.9%
CTax2 -0.4% 3.9% 4.0% 8.0% 3.3% 11.9% 1.3%
CTax3 -1.9% 3.5% 3.8% 8.2% 3.3% 12.3% 1.2%
CTax4 -2.7% 2.6% 3.3% 8.6% 3.3% 12.9% 0.9%
2050‐2005 ( average per year )
BaU 3.5% 2.6% 3.4% 4.6% 2.1% 8.6% 2.4%
CTax1 1.9% 3.2% 3.3% 6.0% 2.1% 10.4% 1.9%
CTax2 -1.6% 2.9% 3.0% 6.4% 2.1% 11.1% 1.7%
CTax3 -2.0% 2.5% 2.6% 6.5% 2.1% 11.4% 1.6%
CTax4 -2.2% 1.7% 2.2% 7.0% 2.1% 12.1% 1.3%
 
Notes: Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and backstop carbon-free technologies not included because not used in 2005. 
Table 2. Average growth rate of different components of Total Primary Energy Supply. 
2.7. The  energy  sector 
The transformations induced by climate policy can be grouped into two major 
categories: those increasing energy efficiency and those decreasing the carbon content 
of energy. WITCH produces scenarios with the optimal mix of action along these two 
trajectories (Figure 9). The sufficiently high detail of the energy sector also allows the 
study of the optimal mix of alternative energy technologies (Table 2). 
Figure 9 gives a synthetic description of optimal movements along the dimension 
of energy efficiency and of de-carbonization of energy. The solid lines in both panels 
refer to the BaU scenario. The introduction of emissions taxes reinforces the trend of 
energy efficiency improvements and tilts all the curves upward, indicating a substantial 
de-carbonization of energy in all scenarios, with the exception of the CTax1 scenario 
which reduces emissions mainly by means of energy efficiency improvements. The 
optimal contraction of the carbon content of energy induced by the highest tax scenario   17
is similar in China and India: an average -5.4% and -4.2% per year from 2020 to 2050, 
respectively. 
What are the transformations needed in the power sector and in the energy system 
as a whole to bring along the much needed contraction of the carbon content of energy 
in a climate policy scenario? Table 2 presents synthetic information on major energy 
technologies that are used both in the BaU and in the climate policy scenarios. The 
fastest growing components of TPES in the BaU are wind, solar and nuclear. In all 
climate policy scenarios it is optimal to expand wind, solar and nuclear even further 
momentum. Coal that is not burnt using CCS is the biggest loser in a climate policy 
scenario, although in the CTax1 scenario coal loses only shares of TPES but grows from 
the 2005 level, at both the 2030 and 2050 time horizons. With the CTax2 scenario Coal 
grows in absolute terms at least until 2030 in China. The optimal rate of expansion of 
TPES declines substantially, especially from 2030 until 2050, but TPES will be higher 
in 2050 than in 2030 and 2005. With the most stringent climate policy scenario TPES 
grows 43% in China and 80% in India, from 2005 to 2050. Oil demand will increase by 
70% in China and by 163% in India, during the same period. 
2.8.  Marginal and total costs 
What are the marginal and total costs of reducing emissions in China and how do 
they compare with each other? Figure 10 and Figure 11 present information on these 
important aspects. 
The first message is that marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are time-
specific in long-term IAMs. The economy, the technology, the cost of fuels, all change 
as time goes by and they affect the cost of reducing emissions. Technical progress in 
carbon-free technologies is a major driver of MACCs. Learning-by-doing and learning-
by-researching will reduce the cost of installing and operating wind mills, for example. 
For this reason Figure 10 displays MACCs from 2020 to 2050 at ten-year intervals, 
using data from the four tax scenarios. 
A first analysis of Figure 10 clearly shows that MACCs are highly non-linear, in 
each given year. Pushing the rate of emissions abatement beyond a given threshold 
increases costs beyond what might be economically and politically acceptable. The 
second key message that emerges from Figure 10 is that India has steeper MACCs than   18
China. An emissions tax equal to 216 US$ per ton of CO2-eq induces a 57% contraction 
of emissions in India and a 67% contraction in China. This means that it is not efficient 
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Notes: Marginal abatement cost curves include all GHGs. Abatement potential at different GHGs emissions values. Abatement 
potential expressed in percentage of emissions reductions in the BaU for comparability. Source: WITCH model. 
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Notes: Costs are expressed as the ratio between the discounted sum of GDP losses with respect to the BaU scenario and cumulative 
discounted GDP in the BaU scenario. Two alternative discount rates are used. Source: WITCH model. 
Figure 11. The cost of reducing GHGs emissions. 
Total costs of emissions reductions are displayed in Figure 11. We consider 
macroeconomic costs, which take into account the fact that tax revenues are rebated 
lump-sum economy-wide. Costs therefore emerge as a consequence of a sub-optimal   19
allocation of resources in the economy (not considering the environmental damage). 
Costs are gross of the economic benefits from limiting climate change and are expressed 
as a ratio between discounted GDP losses and BaU discounted GDP. Discount rates of 
3% and 5% are used. 
The four emissions taxes scenarios generate much higher costs in China than in 
India. This is explained by the larger area under the Chinese MACCs displayed in 
Figure 10 for any level of taxation – i.e. China’s contribution to the global public good 
is higher than India’s contribution. The information on the slope of MACCs and on the 
total cost of climate policy thus reveals that a hypothetical international agreement that 
fixes the same percentage reduction of emissions for both China and India would be 
preferred by China. India would instead reject an international agreement that fixes the 
same taxation level as in China. 
Figure 11 has important implications for future negotiations on climate change as 
countries will not accept excessively high policy costs. Bosetti and Frankel (2009) have 
examined an international climate architecture which is based on the postulate that 
countries will not cooperate to reduce emissions if – among other conditions – costs will 
exceed 1% of GDP in discounted terms. This implies that China would not accept any 
policy that bears, implicitly or explicitly, a price on emissions greater than the CTax1 
scenario; India would not accept a tax above the CTax2 level. A “politically feasible” 
treaty would therefore see China increasing emissions by 70% with respect to 2005, 
India by 85%. It is therefore evident that the G8 and the MEF declarations appear totally 
unrealistic. Either G8 countries reduce emissions more than what they have pledged 
(but they can hardly go below zero by 2050), or they need to mobilize massive financial 
aid to support mitigation in developing countries. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we use historical data and future scenarios produced by the 
Integrated Assessment Model WITCH to highlight the many differences between the 
two Asian giants. China and India are too often cited together in the climate change 
debate. However, although some similarities do exist – a large population and booming 
economies above all – they are two very different countries in many respects.   20
There is first a problem of scale: China’s carbon dioxide emissions – the most 
important among all Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) – were four times higher than India’s 
emissions in 2005, and our Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario says that in 2050 they 
will still be 3.5 times higher. Second, there is a problem of equity: India is expected to 
achieve China’s same level of emissions per capita not earlier than 2050 and China will 
have a GDP per capita three times higher than India at least until 2050, according to our 
BaU scenario. Therefore it is neither realistic, nor fair, to expect these two very different 
countries to make similar engagements in climate change negotiations. 
All the differences that we highlight in historical data and in the BaU scenario are 
magnified by a hypothetical tax on GHGs emissions. In all the four scenarios examined, 
China appears to be more responsive to climate policy than India. India has relatively 
high abatement costs and requires very high levels of taxation to reduce its emissions 
below the 2005 level. In our highest tax scenario China would reduce its total GHGs by 
35% with respect to 2005, while a 50% emissions increase would be optimal for India. 
More importantly, despite all the emphasis that surrounds the remarkable 
economic performance of both countries, China and India remain two relatively poor 
countries if compared to richer economies: in 2050, after a prolonged period of growth 
China’s GDP per capita is expected to be only one-third of the average GDP per capita 
in OECD countries; India’s GDP per capita will only be one-tenth. It is therefore 
extremely unlikely that both countries will accept binding stringent emission reductions 
targets in the next two or three decades. The Copenhagen pledges of China and India 
confirm their – comprehensible – reluctance to contribute to global emissions reductions. 
Indeed, emissions intensity targets appear to be part of a national strategy to increase 
energy efficiency rather than part of a deliberate plan to reduce global warming. 
China and India, in particular, are therefore likely to remain marginal players in 
the fight against global warming for still some time. A realistic commitment would be 
in line with the lowest level of taxation that we have examined. A set of domestic 
policies that establishes an implicit or explicit tax on all GHGs equal to 10 US$ per 
tonne of CO2-eq in 2020 and then increases to 50 US$ in 2050 would cut global 
emissions by 8% in 2050. Even if the price of emissions is the same in the two countries, 
India would abate less GHGs than China and thus suffer lower costs, in this scenario.   21
However, this “politically feasible” commitment from China and India would 
clash against the G8 and MEF target of reducing global emissions by 50% in 2050, 
which would require – even if accounting for an equitable distribution of emissions 
reductions – a much greater effort from both countries. If rich economies really want to 
maintain their promises they need to provide massive financial aid to China and in 
particular to India. 
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